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MISSOURI V. SEIBERT: TWO-STEPPING
TOWARDS THE APOCALYPSE
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Missouri v. Seibert, the Supreme Court ruled that a police officer's
use of the "question first" (a.k.a. "two-step") interrogation technique
rendered the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona1 ineffective and that
the resulting statement must be held inadmissible at trial. The Court
affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision that this practice, which
involves withholding the Miranda warnings until a suspect has already
given a statement and then prompting the suspect to repeat the unwarned
statement, was wrongly used in Patricia Seibert's post-arrest interrogation
to defeat the purpose of the Mirandawarnings.3 The Court distinguished its
earlier ruling in Oregon v. Elstadwhich permitted a defendant's confession
to be admitted into evidence despite the fact that he had made a prior selfincriminating statement before receiving his Miranda warnings.4 In
Seibert, the Court based its decision not on the traditional analysis of
whether the respective statements were voluntary or coerced, but rather on
whether the Miranda warning, when given midstream, was truly effective.5
The plurality ruled that a waiver of Miranda rights could be given
voluntarily but that the structure of a two-step interrogation could still
render that waiver invalid by confusing the suspect as to the "nature of his
6
rights and the consequences of abandoning them.",
The Court did not overrule Elstad, but rather it added a new level of
analysis to determine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings given midstream. Although the Court vigorously criticized police who use the "two-

' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).

' Id. at 2607.
4 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
5 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611.
6 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,424 (1986)).
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step" interrogation technique as an "end-run" around Miranda, it chose not
to implement a clear rule barring this technique in all cases.7
This note argues that instead of solving the troubling issues which
brought this case before the Court, the Seibert opinion added another layer
of ungainly analysis to an already abstruse process. The Court left police
without a clear rule of conduct and gave lower courts the unenviable task of
determining not just whether a suspect's Miranda rights were waived
voluntarily but also whether the warnings themselves were effective given
the "totality of the confusion" surrounding a custodial interrogation.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF MIRANDA'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. MIRANDA AND ITS MANY EXCEPTIONS
Until 1966, the predominant standard for determining whether a
defendant's confession could be admitted at trial was the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 In the decades before Miranda,the
Court rested the question of admissibility of confessions on whether it
believed the defendant's "will was overborne" during interrogation. 9 To
accomplish this inquiry, the Court examined the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the defendant's interrogation and confession,
taking into account not only the conduct of the interrogators but also the
impact on the accused.' 0 Despite applying this test on a regular basis," the
Court struggled to articulate a clear standard for determining when a
suspect's will was overborne. In the years leading up to the Miranda
decision, the Court acknowledged that an evolving desire for fairness in
police procedure had complicated the Court's efforts to articulate a precise
due process test for involuntary confessions. 12 Although the Miranda
decision eclipsed due process as the governing standard for police
interrogations, the "totality of the circumstances" analysis remains the basis
13
of all inquiries into the voluntariness of a challenged confession.
Throughout the decade preceding Miranda,the Court evinced a strong
concern that coercive interrogation techniques produced unreliable and

7 Id.at 2607.
8 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
9 Id. at 434.
10Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
11In the three decades leading up to Miranda, the Court applied this test in thirty
different cases. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
12Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 115 (1998).
13Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
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untrustworthy confessions. 14 Furthermore, coercive police tactics offended
a community's "sense of fair play and decency."' 5 These dual concerns
culminated in the Court's Miranda decision.
The Miranda Court
acknowledged that a custodial interrogation is an inherently coercive
atmosphere which "exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals."' 16 The Court recognized that a suspect placed
in such a situation was especially likely to waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 17 To prevent potential infringements of
suspects' Fifth Amendment rights, the Court established "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow."' 18 These guidelines clearly stated that a confession would be
inadmissible at trial if the defendant had not first been informed that he "has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires."' 9 If the accused invoked these rights at any
time during an interrogation, the police had to respect this request and stop
the interrogation. Any failure by the police to comply would trigger the
exclusionary
rule, rendering any resulting statement inadmissible in a court
20
of law.
However, soon after declaring these clear "constitutional guidelines,"
the Supreme Court created a number of exceptions to Miranda's
exclusionary rule. In Harrisv. New York, the Court refused to completely
exclude a statement given by a defendant despite the fact that he was not
provided the Miranda warnings.2 ' Instead of deeming the statement
inadmissible because of this violation, the Court ruled that it could be used
by the prosecution to impeach the defendant's testimony, but not in the
case-in-chief.22 Because the defendant did not claim his statement was
coerced, the Court determined the statement was trustworthy 23 and
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances test and therefore did not

14

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.

534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
15 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
16 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
'7 Id. at 439.
18 Id. at 442.
19Id. at 479.
20 Id. at 469.
21 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
22 Id. at 224.
23

id.
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warrant complete exclusion.24 In Michigan v. Tucker, the Court allowed the
admission of testimony from a witness identified by a statement taken in
2 5 Justice
violation of Miranda.
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted
that although the police did disregard the commands of Miranda, they did
not violate the underlying Fifth Amendment rights which the Miranda
Court had set out to protect.2 6 The idea that Miranda'sexclusionary rule is
an overinclusive command which "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment" is the foundation of almost all the Mirandaexceptions.27 Ten
years later, the Court's ruling in New York v. Quarles created a "public
safety" exception to Miranda.28 The Court determined that police were not
required to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect if they had a reasonable
concern for the public's safety. 29 The next year, in Oregon v. Elstad,
the
30
Court established the exception reconsidered in Missouri v. Seibert.
B. OREGON V.ELSTAD-ADMITTING A VOLUNTARY CONFESSION
GIVEN AFTER A MID-STREAM MIRANDA WARNING
1. Majority Ruling
Elstad addressed the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
requires suppression of a voluntary statement made after a suspect has
waived his Miranda rights if the suspect had given an earlier, voluntary but
unwarned statement to police.31 The Court ruled that the second statement,
if given in the absence of coercion, was admissible.32 The case was brought
by a defendant convicted of burglary by the State of Oregon. 3 Upon arrest,
the defendant had a brief conversation with police at his house in which he

24

Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 127.

25 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
26 Id. at 445-46.
27
2'
29

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
Id. at 656. In Quarles, police apprehended a rape suspect who they believed was

armed. Id. at 651-52. Finding the suspect to be unarmed, the police, without providing the
Miranda warnings, asked the suspect where he had put his gun. Id. at 652. The suspect
subsequently showed the officers where he had left the gun. Id. The Court allowed the
admission of both the gun and the defendant's statement into evidence. Id. at 659-60.
30 Elstad,470 U.S. 298.
31 Id. at 300. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and White.
32 Id. at 318.
13 Id. at 300.
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admitted to being involved in a burglary. 34 However, the defendant was not
given the Miranda warnings until he was taken to the police station, at
which point he waived his rights and gave a full confession.35 The trial
court refused to suppress the defendant's post-warning statement despite the
fact that he made an incriminating statement before receiving the Miranda
warnings.36 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the
grounds that the defendant's initial, unwarned confession had "let the cat
out of the bag" and created a coercive situation from which the defendant
believed he could not escape, save for repeating his unwarned confession.37
On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Oregon
Court of Appeals.3 8 The Court ruled that because both of the defendant's
statements were given voluntarily, Miranda's broad exclusionary rule
should not apply to the second, warned statement.39 Citing the absence of
"any coercion or improper tactics," the Court determined that the dual
rationales for the Miranda warning, ensuring the trustworthiness of
testimony and deterring impermissible police behavior, were not pressing in
this case. 40 The Court distinguished cases in which actual physical or
verbal coercion was used to elicit an unwarned statement from cases like
Elstad's, in which a simple failure to warn created an irrebuttable
"presumption of compulsion.', 41 in cases where the first statement was
actually coerced (an "involuntary" confession), the Court conceded that the
"taint" of the coercive tactics could render the second statement
involuntary. 42 In such cases, it advocated a strict examination of a number
of different factors to determine if this "taint" dissipated before the second
statement was given.43 In contrast, the Court explained that any inadvertent
or unintentional delay in implementing the "prophylactic Miranda
procedures" could be redeemed simply with a defendant's "voluntary and
informed waiver" if there was no evidence of actual coercion. 44 Applying
this standard to the defendant, the Court found that Elstad's second
34Id. at 301. After the arresting officer informed the defendant that he believed the

defendant had participated in a burglary, the defendant replied "Yes, I was there." Id.
35id.
36 Id. at 302.
37 Id. at 303.
38 Id. at 300.
31Id. at 308.
40

id

41

Id. at 314.

42 Id.at 310.
43Id. The factors include time elapsed between confessions, the change in the location

of the interrogation, and any change in the identity of the interrogator. Id.
44Id.at 309.
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statement was voluntary because neither interrogation had any "earmarks of
coercion" and the interrogating officers did not exploit the inadmissible first
statement to elicit the post-warning statement. 45 Thus, even though the
failure to warn cast a presumption of compulsion on Elstad's first
statement, the effect of this presumed coercion was completely dissipated
by Elstad's voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.4 6 Looking forward, the

Court declined to establish strict guidelines for when courts should apply
this new exception.4 7 Instead it resorted back to the traditional test for
voluntariness under the48 Fourteenth Amendment, the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis.
To understand the Court's opinion in Seibert, it is important to
examine the arguments that the ElstadCourt found unpersuasive. First, the
Court rejected classifying a post-warning confession as a "fruit" of an
inadmissible pre-warning statement.4 9 It found Elstad's analogy to the
Fourth Amendment's "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine unpersuasive.50
The Court clearly distinguished evidence gained in an illegal search from
evidence gained through an unwarned confession. 51 According to the
Court, an illegal search is in itself unconstitutional, while interrogating a
suspect without providing the Miranda warnings does not itself rise to the
level of a constitutional violation until evidence from that interrogation is
Expanding on this notion, the Court stated that
brought into court.
suspects do not have a constitutional right to the Mirandawarnings, only to
the underlying rights they mention.53 The Court also rejected the Oregon
Court of Appeals' "cat out of the bag" argument. 54 The Court stressed that
Miranda only protects defendants from coercive interrogations, not any
The Court
other factors which might compel a suspect to confess.
refused, in its words, to give the "psychological effects of voluntary
unwarned admissions constitutional implications. '' 56 By ruling that the
45 Id. at 3 16.
46 Id. 310-11.
41Id. at 318,
48 Although the majority never used the exact phrase, they instruct lower courts to
consider "the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect
to the suspect in evaluating the voluntaries of his statements." Id.
41 Id.at 307.
50 Id.at 306.
51 Id.
52 id.

13Id.at
54Id.at
" Id.at
56 Id.at

305.
311.
312.
311.
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stress of having previously confessed was too "speculative and
attenuated" 57 to have a discernable impact on the decision to confess again,
the Court effectively stuffed the cat back in the bag and threw it into the
river. Finally, the Court dismissed Elstad's argument that the police should
have explained that his pre-waming statement could not be used against
him.58 Noting that police have enough trouble determining when to give
Miranda warnings in the first ptlace,,the Court declined to impose a special
duty to provide this supplemental warning when police believe they may
have violated Miranda'sdirections. 59
2. Brennan's "Apocalyptic" Dissent
In a dissent that exceeded the majority opinion by over thirty pages in
length, Justice Brennan railed against the conclusions of the majority which
he felt had dealt a "potentially crippling blow to Miranda.'' 60 Justice
Brennan warned that allowing police departments to indirectly avoid
Miranda's directives invited widespread use of tactics "inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive to personal liberty.'
Justice Brennan assailed the majority's arguments, starting with its
assertion that the coercive taint of an unwamed statement did not pass on to
62 Justice Brennan cited Clewis v. Texas63
a second, warned statement.
which deemed a second, warned statement inadmissible if it was obtained
in "one continuous process" with the first statement. 64 Justice Brennan
advocated placing the burden of proof that the warned confession was
obtained independently of the previous, inadmissible confession on the
prosecution. 65 He then disputed the rejection of the "cat out of the bag"
argument. Citing Darwin v. Connecticut,66 Justice Brennan noted that the
Court had previously recognized that a confession could be improperly
compelled by the "existence of [an] earlier confession. 6 7 Justice Brennan
pointed out another flaw in the contention that a voluntary Miranda waiver
17

Id.at 313.

5 Id.at 316.
59Id.

60 Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice
Marshall. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Id.at 364.
61 Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,

340 (1939)).
62 Id.at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967).
64 Elstad,470 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65

Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

66 391 U.S. 346, 350-51 (1968).
67 Elstad,470 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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would cure any coercive taint: it does not consider whether the suspect
realizes his first statement cannot be used against him.68 This lack of
understanding calls into question whether a suspect ignorant of this fact can
make a "rational and intelligent choice" to waive his rights and whether the
waiver is truly "an act of free will."'69 Finally, Justice Brennan took issue
with the argument that unwamed statements should only be excluded from
evidence if elicited through actual coercion, "improper tactics," or
"inherently coercive methods" which "undermine the suspect's ability to
exercise his free will. ' 70 Rejecting the conclusion that Miranda warnings
are not themselves guaranteed by the Constitution, Justice Brennan asserted
that a failure to provide Miranda warnings is in itself an improper '71
tactic
"calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will.
In addition to responding to the majority's arguments, Justice Brennan
dedicated pages of his dissent to examining the practical implications of the
Court's ruling.72 He described in detail the "question first" procedure,
which although not used on the suspect in Elstad,would become the crux of
the Seibert case. 73 Fearing intentional "question first" or "two-step"
interrogation would become a widespread practice, Justice Brennan
advocated a bright line exclusionary rule for both the unwarned and
subsequent, warned statements to deter improper withholding of Miranda
warnings. 74 Anything less would remove police officers' incentive to
provide the warnings.75 The majority pejoratively referred to Justice
Brennan's "apocalyptic tone" and dismissed his concerns as unfounded.7 6
C. CIRCUIT SPLITS: WHAT IF A VIOLATION IS INTENTIONAL?
Although Elstaddirected courts to focus solely on the voluntariness of
a defendant's waiver in cases where the initial failure to warn was
inadvertent, it did not provide clear direction on how to rule when the
failure to warn was a deliberate choice on the part of the interrogating
officers. Without this clear direction, lower courts struggled to formulate

68
69

Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). These sentiments were expressed more successfully

twenty years later in Missouriv. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
70 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
71Id.at 345 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
72 Id. at 328-32, 344-45, 357-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73Id.at 328-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74Id.at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75Id.(Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 318 n.5.
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just results in cases where the police intentionally ignored Miranda's
commands.
1. Carter and Gale-Blocking the "End-Run"
Four years after Elstad,the Eighth Circuit confronted this question and
ruled that both the warned and unwarned statements should be suppressed.
In United States v. Carter, the defendant challenged the admissibility of a
statement he made after he was interrogated for an hour and a half
regarding a workplace theft.77 The postal inspectors conducting Carter's
interrogation provided the Miranda warnings only after he had already
made incriminating statements. 78 After receiving the warnings, he waived
his rights and submitted a written confession admitting his guilt. 79 Despite
the fact that Carter's second confession was voluntarily given, the Eighth
Circuit examined the "totality of the circumstances" and found the case
factually distinct from Elstad.80 Noting that Carter's interrogation was one
continuous process and that there was no doubt as to the custodial nature of
the questioning, the court determined that this case was different enough
from Elstad to warrant suppressing both the warned and unwarned
statements.8 ' The court did not contend that Carter's second statement was
involuntary, but rather expressed its disapproval with the inspectors' failure
82
to warn, calling the practice an impermissible "end-run" around Miranda.
In an interesting twist, the Eighth Circuit cited Justice O'Connor's dismissal
.of Justice Brennan's Elstad dissent as "apocalyptic" (i.e. hysterical and
unrealistic) to prove that the Supreme Court
did not intend cases like Carter
83
to fall under Elstad'sforgiving shelter.
Three years later, the District of Columbia Circuit encountered a case
more factually similar to Elstad and upheld the admission of a post-warning
statement. In UnitedStates v. Gale, the court ruled that police questioning
during a drug arrest was analogous to the inadvertent questioning that
occurred in Elstad.4 Finding the error on the part of the arresting officers
to be inoffensive to due process, the court allowed the post-warning
statement to stand.8 5 However, the court contemplated what it would do if
" 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989).
78 Id.at 369.
79 id.

'0Id at 373-74.
8' Id.at 373.
82 Id.
83 Id.
'4 952

F.2d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
" Id.at 1417.
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confronted by a situation more akin to the Carter case: "[w]e do not of
course sanction the police officers' failure promptly to advise appellant of
his Miranda rights following his arrest; we find no evidence of a deliberate
'end run' around Miranda and, consequently, no error in the district court's
refusal to suppress appellant's fourth statement. 86 Thus, two federal courts
of appeals supported, at least in principle, the idea that a post-warning
statement should be excluded from evidence if the failure to warn was a
deliberate attempt to avoid the directives of Miranda.
2. Esquilin and Orso-Post-Warning Statements Admissible under Elstad
Nearly a decade would pass before this issue reemerged in the federal
courts of appeals. This time around, the Elstad decision fared better. In
United States v. Esquilin, the First Circuit affirmed the admission of a
voluntary post-warning statement made by a defendant arrested on drug
charges. 87 The defendant asserted that Elstad was not applicable in this
case because his interrogation was "one continuous process" and that the
arresting officers' failure to warn constituted an "improper tactic. '88 The
court ruled that a pre-warning statement did not need to be separated in time
from a second, post-warning statement, unless the first statement was
actually physically or psychologically coerced.89 If the first statement was
coerced, a lapse in time would help determine whether the coercion passed
on to the second statement. But because Esquilin's pre-warning statement
was deemed voluntary, no such interval was required. 90 The court then
moved on to the defendant's alternate argument, that a deliberate failure to
warn was an "improper tactic" which taints any subsequent statements with
a presumption of compulsion, regardless of voluntariness. 91 The court
disagreed with Esquilin's contention that the meaning of the "improper
tactics" referred to in Elstad could be separated or distinguished from the
truly coercive tactics described elsewhere in the opinion. 92 Finally, the
86

Id. at 1418.

" 208 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
88 Id. at 319. Esquilin argued that he was subjected to one long interrogation which was
distinct from the two separate questionings that occurred in Elstad. Id.
89

id.

90 Id.
91 Id. at 319-20; see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 ("[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned
admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.").
92 Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 320. "If we read Elstad as a coherent whole, it follows that
'deliberately coercive or improper tactics' are not two distinct categories, as Esquilin would
have it, but simply alternative descriptions of the type of police conduct that many render a
suspect's initial, unwarned statement involuntary." Id. Thus, a police action would not be
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court noted that the unstated, subjective intent of the arresting officer
should not be factored into the calculus of voluntariness because 93it could
not have impacted Esquilin's decision to give his second statement.
In UnitedStates v. Orso, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a case in
which the subjective intent of the arresting officer was clear.94 The
arresting postal inspector admitted he intentionally withheld the Miranda
warnings from the defendant after she had been arrested, handcuffed, and
notified of the accusations against her. 95 In his words: "[w]e wanted to
eventually speak with Miss Orso and thought that if we Mirandized her
right away that she might not want to speak with us."' 96 Although this
appears to be the type of "end-run" decried by both Justice Brennan in his
Elstad dissent and the Eighth Circuit in Carter, the court directly applied
Elstad.97 And upon finding that Orso's second statement was given
voluntarily, the court deemed it admissible. 98 Orso contended that such a
deliberate failure to warn should cast a "taint" on all evidence and
testimony acquired thereafter, in the same way the "fruit of the poison tree"
doctrine prohibits the admission of evidence found in the course of an
illegal search. 99 The court briefly reconsidered this argument, which was
dealt with in Elstad, and affirmed that the "fruits" doctrine is inapplicable to
Fifth Amendment cases.100 Following the First Circuit in Esquilin, the court
also quickly dispensed with the suggestion that "improper tactics" could be
separated from the question of voluntariness.101
D. THE IMPACT OF DICKERSON: RECONSTITUTIONALIZING MIRANDA
In the year 2000, the United States Supreme Court confronted a
challenge to Miranda which had loomed on the horizon for thirty-two
years. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
considered an "improper tactic" forbidden by Elstad unless it rendered the suspect's
statement involuntary. Id.at 321.
93Id. The court reasoned that a suspect cannot take into consideration what he has no
way of knowing.
94 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

" Id.at 1034.
96

Id.

Id, at 1034-35.
98 Id.at 1040.
17

99 Id.at

1034.

1oo
Id.at 1035. In footnote 3, the court rhetorically asks why the "fruits" doctrine does
not apply to the Fifth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court's 2000 ruling in Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Orso, 266 F.3d at 1034-35 n.3. For a discussion of
the tension between Dickerson and Elstad,see infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
101Orso, 266 F.3d at 1036.
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Streets Act.10 2 Section 3501 of the Act required judges to admit all
voluntary confessions into evidence and established a procedure for
determining whether a confession was given voluntarily. 10 3 The Act
instructed judges to consider a number of factors including many of the
elements dealt with in the Miranda warnings.10 4 However, § 3501 clearly
stated that none of these factors alone were determinative of voluntariness
and that the final decision would be left up to the trial judge.1' By granting
this discretion, Congress effectively eliminated the "presumption of
compulsion" that a failure to warn triggered by Miranda.0 6 Although §
3501 was a direct attempt by Congress to overturn Miranda, neither the
Department of Justice nor the courts advocated its application for more than
three decades. 10 7 However, in 2000, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required, and that § 3501
was
08
an acceptable substitute for the judge-created warnings in Miranda.
The Supreme Court, in a seven to two opinion, reversed the Fourth
Circuit in Dickerson v. United States, and declared that "Miranda,being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an
Act of Congress.. ,,109 The Court acknowledged that it was bound to
uphold acts of Congress which create rules of evidence and procedure for
federal courts, but not acts which violate constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 110 The Court explained that the Miranda warnings, although
"prophylactic" in function, safeguarded a constitutionally guaranteed right

102

George C. Thomas, III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:

"Embedded" in Our National Culture?, 2002 CRIME & JUST. 203, 205 (2002); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1968).
103 Id.

104The Act suggested that judges consider:

(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it
was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the
offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not
such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel;
and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned
and when giving such confession.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 436 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968)).
1o5ld.
106 Thomas & Leo, supra note 102, at 205.
107 Charles D. Weisselberg, Panel Five: Deterring Police from Deliberately Violating
Miranda: In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH L. REv. 1121, 1131-32 (2001).
108Thomas & Leo, supra note 102, at 205.
109 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
10 Id.at 437.
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and were therefore "constitutionally based.""' The Court then moved on to
the intellectually treacherous territory of the exceptions it had established in
cases like Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad. Rather than disturbing the
foundation of these decisions, the Court simply noted that the exceptions
"illustrate the principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but
that no constitutional rule is immutable."' 2 Probably sensing that this was
not a wholly satisfactory justification, the Court expanded its explanation
by focusing on the Elstad exception. 1 3 In the lower court decision, the
Fourth Circuit seized on the following sentence in Elstad to prove that the
Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required: "'the Miranda
exclusionary rule... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself.""'1 4 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
since the rule is broader than the right which it protects, it would inevitably
be implemented in situations in which a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights
were not threatened.' 15 The Court made a definite, if not fully elucidating,
response to this argument by stating that "[o]ur decision in that caserefusing to apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth
Amendment cases--does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional
decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the
Fifth Amendment." 16
Thus Dickerson brought Miranda into the new century with a
reinvigorated constitutional foundation but also some murky dicta regarding
'its exceptions.
III. MISSOURI V. SEIBERT
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Death of JonathanSeibert and DonaldRector
On February 12, 1997 Patrice Seibert of Rolla, Missouri awoke to find
that her severely disabled son, Jonathan, had died in his sleep.' 17 Seibert
...Id.at 440.
112

Id. at 441.

113

Id.

114

United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 690 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985)).
115 id.
"' Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
117 State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2002).
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8
did not call the police or other authorities because Jonathan had bedsores."
Fearing that she would be charged with neglect, Seibert enlisted the help of
her older son Darian and a friend of his to cover up Jonathan's death by
setting fire to Seibert's trailer home." 9 During the planning of the crime, it
was decided that Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager who also lived with
Seibert, would be left in the trailer so as to prevent the appearance that
Jonathan had been left unattended. 120 Later that afternoon, Seibert gave
Darian and his friend money to buy gasoline to use in setting the fire, sent
her two youngest sons to church, packed a bag for herself and left the
trailer. 121 Darian and his friend returned and set fire to the trailer, killing
Donald Rector and severely burning Darian in the process.122

2. The Arrest andInterrogationofPatriceSeibert
Five days later, Rolla Police Officer Richard Hanrahan asked the St.
Louis Police to arrest Seibert, who was visiting Darian in the bum ward of
St. Louis Hospital. 123 Hanrahan asked arresting officer Kevin Clinton
specifically not to provide Seibert with the Miranda warnings upon
arrest.124 Seibert was arrested at 3:00 a.m. and transported to an
interrogation room in St. Louis County. 125 Hanrahan waited approximately
fifteen to twenty minutes before entering the room to, in his words, "give
her a little time to think about the situation."' 126 Hanrahan then questioned
Seibert, without providing the Miranda warnings, for thirty to forty
minutes. 127 During this questioning, Hanrahan spoke in a conversational
tone, at one point lightly squeezed Seibert's arm, and repeatedly prompted
Seibert to admit that she had intended Donald to die in the fire. 128 Seibert
admitted her role in the crime and was then given a twenty minute break in
which she smoked a cigarette and drank some coffee. 129 Hanrahan then
returned to the interrogation room with a tape recorder, gave Seibert her
Miranda warnings, and began questioning her again.' 30 He began the
118

Id. at *3; State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002).

119 Seibert, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *2.
120
121

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.

122 Id. at *5.
123 Id.at *13.
124

Id.

125Id.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2606 (2004).
128 Id.
129 Seibert, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *14.
130 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
126
127
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interrogation by referring to the previous conversation, "Ok, 'trice, we've
been talking for a little while about what happened on Wednesday the
twelfth, haven't we?' 31 When Seibert's confession diverged from her
previous32 statement, Hanrahan reminded her of what she had said to him
earlier.1
Hanrahan later testified that he made a "conscious decision" to
withhold Seibert's Miranda warnings and that Seibert's second, taped
confession was "largely 33a repeat of information... obtained" in the first,
unwarned interrogation.1
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At trial, Seibert requested that both her first and second confessions be
suppressed. 134 The court suppressed the first, but not the second statement
and convicted Seibert of second-degree murder.' 35 The Missouri Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the second statement,
36
finding Seibert's case to be indistinguishable from Esquilin and Orso.1
The Supreme Court of Missouri subsequently reversed the court of
appeals. 137 The Missouri Supreme Court found Elstad and its progeny not
controlling because Hanrahan deliberately withheld the Miranda warnings,
and the interrogation was more or less one continuous process. 138 The court
ruled that an intentional violation of Miranda warrants a stricter standard of
39
Reasoning
exclusion than an "inadvertent" violation like that in Elstad.1
that such intentional violations deserve a strong rebuke, the court
determined that Officer Hanrahan's conduct comprised an impermissible
"end-run" around Miranda which rendered Seibert's second statement
140
involuntary and inadmissible.

131 Id.
132 Id. When Seibert claimed she believed Donald was not supposed to die in the fire,
Hanrahan prompted her by asking, "'Trice, didn't you tell me that he was supposed to die in
his sleep?" Id.

133 Id.
134 Id.

Id.
State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *22 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2002). The court of appeals considered these federal cases persuasive authority because
Seibert's claims dealt with constitutional issues. Id. For background on these cases, see
supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
137 State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002).
135
136

131 Id. at 706.
139 Id. at 704.
140 Id. at 706-07.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on Seibert's case
to resolve the
circuit split caused by the conflict between Esquilin, Orso,
14 1
and Carter.
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1. The PluralityOpinion
Writing for a four justice plurality, Justice Souter began his opinion
affirming the Missouri Supreme Court with a brief summary of the Miranda
warnings' constitutional basis. 142 Justice Souter stressed the importance of
the warnings as both a valuable protection for defendants and an effective
tool for police and prosecutors. 143 Justice Souter then examined the "twostep" interrogation technique used by Officer Hanrahan to elicit Seibert's
confession. 144 After noting that many police training programs advocate
"two-step" interrogation as a way to question suspects "outside of
Miranda," the Court concluded that this practice deprives
suspects of
45
adequate notice of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. 1
The plurality accepted Elstad's premise that in cases involving a midstream Miranda warning, the admissibility of the second statement is
governed at least in part by whether it was voluntarily given. 46 However,
rather than examining whether Seibert's second statement was in fact
voluntary, the plurality chose to focus on the efficacy of the Miranda
warnings themselves. Justice Souter asserted that the goal of a two-step
interrogation is to impel a suspect to make statements she would not
otherwise make if she fully understood her rights. 47 The plurality doubted
whether after giving a full, incriminating statement, a suspect would
actually believe that she still had the right to remain silent. 148 More likely,
the suspect would be confused as to how remaining silent could benefit her
if she has already spoken. 149 Barring a direct explanation that the pre141Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
142 Id. at 2607-08. Justice Souter's plurality was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg,

and Breyer.
143 Id. at 2608. Justice Souter noted that withholding the warnings almost always
excludes a statement, while a voluntarily given waiver serves as "virtual ticket of
admissibility." Id.
4 Id. at 2608-09.
141 Id. at 2610.
146 Id. at 2610 n.4.
147 Id. at 2610-11.
148 Id. at 2611.
149

Id.
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warning statement cannot be used, the Court doubted whether a suspect's
waiver of her Fifth Amendment rights could actually be "knowing" as well
as "voluntary.' 50 According to Justice Souter, the inevitable result of a
"two-step" interrogation is to "deprive a defendant of knowledge essential
to [her] ability to understand
the nature of [her] rights and the consequences
151
of abandoning them."
Justice Souter then took pains to distinguish this case from Elstad.
Citing a number of factual differences, the plurality determined that the
warning provided in Elstad presented a "genuine choice whether to follow
up on the earlier admission," thus rendering the post-warning statement
admissible under the "knowing" standard.152 Using these distinctions,
Justice Souter outlined a rough factor test to determine whether the midstream warning effectively communicated Seibert's rights and thereby
presented her with a genuine choice to waive them.'53 The factors are as
follows:
the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of
the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which
54
the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. 1

Given that Seibert was interrogated by the same officer, in the same
location, with only a short break in between statements, and that the
interrogating officer used the first, unwarned statement to prompt the
second, warned statement, the plurality concluded that the interrogation was
one continuous process designed to confuse Seibert about the existence and
extent of her rights. 55 The plurality also singled out Hanrahan's failure to
inform Seibert that her first statement could
not be used in court as an
56
aggravating factor in the Court's calculus.1
Although both the petitioner and the respondent framed the central
issue of the case as whether an intentional violation of Miranda warrants
150

Id.

151Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)) (internal quotations
omitted).
112 Id. at 2612. The Court noted that the two statements in Elstadwere separated in time,
given in different locations, given to different officers, and the interrogating officer made no
effort to use the first statement to elicit the second statement. Id. at 2611-12.
151 Id. at 2612.
154 Id. at 2612-13.
155Id.
156 In footnote 7, Justice Souter cautioned that such an advisement would not necessarily
have cured the defects of the interrogation, but noted that the lack thereof "blunt[ed] the
efficacy of the warnings and point[ed] to a continuing, not a new, interrogation." Id. at 2612
n.7.
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automatic exclusion of the resulting statements, the plurality did not
advocate conducting an inquiry into the subjective motivations of the
interrogating officer. 157

In Seibert, the interrogating officer admitted to

trying to evade the strictures of Miranda, but the plurality recognized this
was an unusual case.' 58 Rather than depend on the police to be forthright
about the motivations behind their interrogation procedures, the plurality
directed lower courts to examine the objective facts of the interrogation to
determine whether a suspect would reasonably understand her rights and
could make a voluntary and knowing waiver. 159
2. ConcurringOpinions
Justice Breyer joined in the opinion of the Court but also authored a
concurring opinion which advocated borrowing the "fruits of the poisonous
tree" doctrine from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 160 Justice Breyer
took this position despite the fact that the Elstad Court specifically rejected
such an appropriation.' 6' He advocated applying the "fruits" doctrine to
Miranda violations because police departments and prosecutors are already
very familiar with the doctrine and its implications. 62 Based on this
analysis, Justice Breyer concluded that the plurality's requirement of an
effective Miranda
waiver would in practice function exactly like the
63
"fruits" doctrine. 1
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the twostep interrogation technique did not pass the balancing test the Court had
64
used when assessing previous exceptions to Miranda'sexclusionary rule.'
Justice Kennedy asserted that admitting statements elicited by a two-step
interrogation gives far too much weight to the needs of law enforcement
while significantly undermining the protections given to suspects' Fifth
Amendment rights. 65 However, Justice Kennedy felt that the Court's
decision prescribed too broad a rule and that the multi-factor analysis
'

Id. at 2612 n.6.

158 Id. ("[T]he intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was

here....").
159 Id. at 2612.
160Id. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
161See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
162 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 2613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring). The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
requires the causal connection between an officer's unconstitutional behavior and any
subsequent admissions by a suspect to be broken by intervening events. Id. (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
'64 Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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in cases where the
proposed by the plurality should only come into play
166
interrogating officer intentionally violated Miranda.
3. O'Connor'sDissent
Justice O'Connor began her dissent by applauding the plurality's
decision not to force fit the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine into the
Fifth Amendment as well as its decision not to let the subjective intent of
167
the interrogating officer determine the admissibility of a confession.
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor accused the plurality of "devour[ing]" her
Elstad opinion. 168 Justice O'Connor took the plurality to task for
resurrecting the "cat out of the bag" argument, which she resoundingly
rejected in Elstad.169 Justice O'Connor believed the plurality's argument
that mid-stream warnings confuse defendants into confessing was
indistinguishable from the repudiated notion that defendants could be
"coerced" by the psychological pressure of having already made a
statement. 170 Justice O'Connor concluded her dissent with an endorsement
of the Elstad standard and a suggestion that Seibert could have made a
strong case for 17suppression of her second statement under Elstad's
voluntariness test. 1
IV. ANALYSIS: ELSTAD DEVOURED OR JUST POORLY DIGESTED?

In the following section, this Note will explore how the Seibert
decision will impact the Elstad exception, consider the challenges courts
\will face in applying the standards set forth in the decision, and attempt to
forecast the effect the decision will have on police interrogation procedures.
The Seibert Court struggled to find a solution that would discourage the
"two-step" interrogation process without disturbing the tenuous balance
struck in Dickerson. In the end, the Court managed to reach a just outcome
for Patrice Seibert, but in doing so it established a confusing and ungainly
standard for police and courts to follow.

166 Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 2616-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
168 Id. at 2616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 2619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that in Seibert's
case, Officer Hanrahan used the pre-warning statement to prompt and direct the second
statement. This fact could be used to call into question the voluntary nature of her second
confession. Id. at 2620.
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A. HOW THE PLURALITY RESURRECTED BRENNAN'S DISSENT IN

WORD BUT NOT DEED
1. What the PluralityDidn'tDo: Overturn Elstad or its Reasoning
In the end, the Court found Patricia Seibert's post-warning statement
to be inadmissible without considering whether it was made voluntarily.
The plurality explicitly deferred on the question of voluntariness because it
was not necessary to the decision. 172 As Justice O'Connor pointed out in
her dissent, this case could have been resolved with the same outcome upon
remand by simply using the Elstad standard of voluntariness. 173 But the
Court wanted to go further and clearly state its disapproval of the "twostep" interrogation technique. In the process of doing so, the plurality
resurrected the voice of, but not the reasoning behind, Justice Brennan's
forceful dissent in Elstad. Just as Justice Brennan decried the inherent
dishonesty of the "two-step" interrogation process and stressed that 'giving
[] the Miranda warnings before reducing the product of the day's work to
written form could not undo what had been done or make legal what was
illegal,"'174 so the plurality in Seibert concluded its opinion by declaring
"[s]trategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot
accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could
not do by statute., 175 Although the Seibert plurality talked as tough as
Justice Brennan, it recognized that most of Justice Brennan's legal
arguments were too tenuous to stand on twenty years after Elstad. In the
end, the Seibert Court declined to establish a bright line exclusionary rule
covering all statements taken after an initial unwarned interrogation, which
was, according to Justice Brennan, the only acceptable solution. 176 Despite
Justice O'Connor's protestations that the plurality had "devoured" the
decision in Elstad, Seibert left the earlier decision muddied but still
standing.
The Seibert plurality clearly abandoned most of Justice Brennan's
legal arguments. The Court could not apply the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine because Dickerson, which reaffirmed Miranda's
"constitutional underpinnings,7 7 nevertheless ruled a Miranda violation
insufficient to trigger the same protections as an illegal search under the
172

Id.at 2613 n.8.

171Id.at 2619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
174Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 330 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting People

v.Bodner, 75 A.D.2d 440,448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (internal quotations omitted)).
175 Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2613.
176 Elstad,470 U.S. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.4 (2000).

2005]

MISSOURI v. SEIBERT

Fourth Amendment. 78 Justice Brennan's argument that a failure to warn
was in itself an "improper tactic" sufficient to trigger a presumption of
compulsion was left by the wayside. 179 As established in Esquilin and
Orso, the Elstad majority did not intend "improper tactics" to be read as
distinct or separate from truly coercive tactics which overbear the will of
the suspect. 80 Finally, the plurality was careful not to invoke the
psychological impact of an unwarned confession on the suspect. Although
it based its opinion on the premise that an initial failure to warn could
confuse a suspect, the plurality took pains to avoid the conclusion that a
previous confession
could psychologically pressure the suspect into
18
confessing anew. '
Despite the urgings of many of the briefs supporting the respondent,
the plurality did not base its decision on the fact that Officer Hanrahan
violated Miranda intentionally. 182 Although Elstad could be read to
indicate that an officer's good faith is a factor in considering the
admissibility of the second statement, the Seibert Court decided not to
examine the subjective intent of the arresting officer. 183 Instead, it
recommended objectively examining the suspect's state of mind during the
interview using the method described below.
2. What the PluralityDid Do: Createa New Test
a. The "Totality of the Confusion"
Elstad, like all of the previous exceptions to Miranda, directed courts
to the default pre-Miranda standard for admissibility: whether the
confession was voluntary under the "totality of the circumstances" test. 184
Some police departments, including Officer Hanrahan's, saw the Elstad
exception as a loophole which gave them license to withhold the Miranda
178

See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.

179 Elstad,470 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

180 See supranotes 89-101 and accompanying text.
181However, Justice O'Connor's dissent asserted that the plurality did not step carefully
enough and ended up making the "cat out of the bag" argument again anyway. Seibert, 124
S. Ct. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182 See Brief for Respondent at 25-34, Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (No.
02-1371); Brief Amici Curiae of Former Prosecutors, Judges and Law Enforcement
Officials, Supporting Respondent at 23-27, Seibert (No. 02-1371); Brief for the American
Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Eastern Missouri, and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-24, Seibert (No.
02-1371).
' Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 n.6.
184 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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warnings until after they had extracted the information they were seeking
from a suspect. 185 As demonstrated in Esquilin and Orso, lower courts
scrutinized this dubious practice but nevertheless found the suspects' postwarning statements to be voluntary and therefore admissible under the
"totality of the circumstances test."' 186 Confronted with a standard that
encouraged improper police tactics, but unwilling to overrule Elstad, the
plurality found a novel way out. The Court did not do away with the
voluntariness test required by Elstad, but rather added a mandatory
objective inquiry into the suspect's state of mind during the interrogation.
This new standard will be referred to hereinafter as the "totality of the
confusion" test. 187 By adding this extra level of analysis, the plurality
implicitly repudiated the notion that a failure to provide the188Miranda
warnings could always be rectified simply by a voluntary waiver.
As mentioned above, Justice Souter focused his opinion on the
effectiveness of a Miranda warning given mid-stream.189 He noted that the
object of the "two-step" interrogation technique is to render the Miranda
warnings ineffective by casting doubt over whether the suspect has a real
choice to continue to talk or not.' 90 Other commentators have noted that
this is the goal of all Miranda violations, to prevent the suspect from seeing
"the Miranda warning and waiver requirements as a crucial transition point
in the questioning or as an opportunity to terminate the interrogation."' 91 In
Miranda, the Court noted that if the police extract an incriminating
statement while questioning a defendant outside the presence of an attorney,
"a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination." 192 Rather than focus on the voluntary nature of Patrice
Seibert's post-warning statement, Justice Souter in effect questioned

185"At the suppression hearing, Officer Hanrahan testified that he made a 'conscious

decision' to withhold Mirandawarnings, thus resorting to an interrogation technique he had
been taught: question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question 'until I get
the answer that she's already provided once."' Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2607.
186 See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
187 This term is wholly the author's invention and is simply meant to serve as shorthand
for the plurality's multifactor test.
188 Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2610.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 146-59.
"' Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2610.
191 Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REv. 397, 435
(1999).
192 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475 (1966) (emphasis added).
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whether the "two-step" interrogation
process prevented her waiver from
93
1
intelligent.
and
knowing
being
The definition of what constitutes a knowing and intelligent waiver
was best articulated in Moran v. Burbine: "the waiver must have been made
with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.', 194 This requisite
awareness has two essential components: that "at all times [the suspect]
knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of
the state's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction .. ,195
Another core element of a knowing and intelligent waiver is that the suspect
understands that she has the option not to waive her rights. 196 After
considering what information was required for a knowing and intelligent
waiver, the Court in Moran ruled that a defendant was not entitled to any
more information than that contained in the Miranda warning itself. 197 The
Court noted that the warning explains the nature of the defendant's rights
(right to remain silent, right to counsel) and the consequences for waiving
them (everything said can be used against the defendant in a court of
law).' 98 However, the Moran Court did not contemplate the possibility that
the Miranda warnings themselves could be given in a manner which
separated them so completely from their intended meaning that they would
fail to convey even this base level of information. By focusing on the
effectiveness of the warnings, Justice Souter questioned whether a warning
given after the suspect had already confessed could reasonably be assumed
to engender the understanding necessary for a valid waiver. 99 In Patrice
Seibert's case, the Court decided it could not. 200 The plurality's decision
established a new test to determine if a suspect had the requisite knowledge,
understanding, and clarity of mind to render her waiver effective.

193Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2610-11.

194475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
195Id.at 422.
196 Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda

Waivers, Confession

Admissibility, and the Retention ofInterrogationProtections,49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1043
(1988).
197 Id.at 1048. The Moran Court declined to find the defendant's waiver invalid despite
the fact that he was kept unaware that a lawyer had been retained for him. The Court
concluded that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly
relinquish a constitutional right." Moran, 475 U.S. at 422.
198 Moran, 475 U.S. at 422.

199 Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2611 (2004).
Id. at 2612-13.

200
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The Court did not explicitly declare that it was establishing a new test
for "two-step" interrogations, but rather listed a number of generalized facts
with which it intended to compare the interrogations
20 2 in Seibert and
Elstad.20 1 These "relevant facts" include the following:
* Completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation;
* The overlapping content of the two statements;
* The timing and setting of the first and the second
interrogations;
* The continuity of police personnel conducting the
interrogation;
* The degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the
second round of questioning as continuous with the first;
" Whether the suspect was informed that the pre-warning
statement could not be used.20 3
Applying these factors, Justice Souter distinguished Patrice Seibert's
double interrogation from the brief questioning in Elstad.2 °4 Seibert was
questioned for thirty to forty minutes regarding the details of the crime and
her involvement in it.20 5 Officer Hanrahan repeated many questions from
the first interrogation in the second session.20 6 The first and second
interrogations were conducted in the same room and separated by only
fifteen to twenty minutes, during which Seibert did not leave the
interrogation room.20 7 Hanrahan began the second session by clearly stating
that he and Seibert had already been discussing the events of the crime.20 8
Finally, Hanrahan gave no indication to Seibert that her first statement was
not admissible in court. 20 9 Justice Souter determined that the aggregate of
these factors "must be seen as challenging the comprehensibility and
efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in
201 Id. at

2612.

202 Id.
203

Id. The plurality mentioned this last variable separately but described it as a

significant, yet not wholly determinative factor in the analysis. Id.
204

Id.

205

Id. at 2606.

206

Id.

207

State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 401, at *14 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30,

2002).
208

Officer Hanrahan began the second, taped interrogation by stating "we've been

talking for a little while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven't we?"
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
209 Id. Hanrahan's constant reference to the first statement argues against this even being
a conceivable assumption on Seibert's part. Id.
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the suspect's shoes would not have understood them to convey a message
that she retained a choice about continuing to talk., 210 According to the
Court, Hanrahan's decision to use the "two-step" interrogation technique
convinced Patrice Seibert that the right to remain silent could not logically
apply to her.21 '
b. Applying the "Totality of the Confusion" to Elstads Progeny
The Court did not explicitly declare that it had created a new test or
when exactly this test should be applied. But considering the methodical
approach it took in comparing Seibert and Elstad, it is clear that lower
courts are to perform this analysis in cases involving a mid-stream warning.
The courts should apply the test regardless of whether the failure to warn
was seemingly inadvertent (as in Elstad) or admittedly intentional (as in
Seibert). The plurality's conclusion suggests a sliding scale for the "totality
of the confusion," with Seibert at one end and Elstadthe other. It is safe to
assume that if the Court had applied the "totality of the confusion" test in
Elstad, it would have found the warning effective and the defendant's
waiver knowing and intelligent. However, a harder question is how this test
would have affected the outcome of the lower court decisions which led up
to Seibert.
In the Carter case, the defendant admitted to stealing from his
workplace after being interrogated by postal inspectors for fifty-five
212
.minutes.2
After the defendant admitted to stealing bearer checks and
allowed agents to search his wallet (in which the inspectors found one of
the missing checks and cash), the inspectors provided the Miranda
warnings. 21'3 After waiving his rights, the defendant immediately wrote a
confession admitting his guilt. 214 The postal inspectors interrogated the

defendant thoroughly and completely regarding the nature of the crime and

his involvement in it. 215 His second statement was a written reiteration of

his first oral statement. The two statements were given in the same room,
to the same personnel, without any break in between.216 There is no
indication that the interrogating inspectors informed the defendant that his
previous statement could not be used against him in a court of law. Given
the confluence of these facts, a court could reasonably conclude that the

211

Id. at 2613.
Id

212

United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 369 (8th Cir. 1989).

213

Id.

214

Id.

215

Id. at 373.
Id. at 369, 373.

210

216
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Miranda warnings were not the significant turning point in the interrogation
that they were intended to be. In this case the "totality of the confusion"
test would likely bar the admissibility of the second statement.
United States v. Gale presents a very different scenario.2 17 In this case,
the arresting officer pulled over the defendant's car and asked the defendant
if he had any drugs.2 18 After the defendant acknowledged that he did and
showed the drugs to the officer, he was placed under arrest. 219 Before
220
searching the defendant, the officer asked him if he had any more drugs.
The defendant responded that he had drugs stashed in the crotch of his pants
and in the trunk of this car. 221 The defendant was then taken to the police
station where he remained in a holding cell for fifty minutes, after which the
arresting officer took him to an interview room and informed him of his
Miranda rights. 222 The defendant waived his rights and told the officer that
he planned to sell the drugs to earn money before he began a restrictive
probation program for a previous narcotics conviction. 223 This case leans
towards the Elstad end of the confusion spectrum. The same police officer
conducted both interrogations and neglected to inform the defendant that
the pre-warning statements could not be used in court. 224 However, the
officer's initial questioning consisted of simply asking the defendant twice
if he had any drugs.225 Furthermore, the defendant's pre- and post-warning
statements dealt with two distinct subjects: whether he possessed any drugs
and what he planned to do with them, respectively.22 6 The two statements
were given to the same officer, but in very different environments and
separated by at least an hour.227 Although the defendant in Gale might have
believed he was already sufficiently incriminated, it is reasonable to
conclude that he did not have to speak further. The post-warning
interrogation was sufficiently separated in time, space, and content to
217

952 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

218 Id. at 1413-14.
219

220
221
222

223

Id. at 1414.
Id.
id.
id.
id.

224 However, since the statement led to the discovery of incriminating
evidence, it is
doubtful this warning would have influenced the defendant's decision to provide a second
statement. It should be noted that under the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Patane this evidence would be admissible despite the fact that it was obtained
through an unwarned statement. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
225

Gale, 952 F.2d at 1414.

226

The court in Gale noted this difference when it distinguished the case from Carter.

Id. at 1418.
227

Id. at 1414.
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convey that this was a distinct experience in which the defendant could
consider his rights anew.
The Esquilin case involves a more complex situation. The defendant
in Esquilin allowed two police officers and a drug sniffing dog to search his
hotel room. 228 When the dog discovered a small plastic bag containing
white powder, the officer conducting the search asked the defendant what
was in the bag. 229 The defendant responded that the bag contained
cocaine. 230 The police stopped questioning the defendant, who had not been
given his Miranda warnings, and waited for a Maine DEA agent to
arrive.23 1 When the agent arrived, the police officers informed him that the
defendant had not been given the Miranda warnings. 232 The agent
proceeded to question the defendant without administering the warnings.233
In response to a question about why he was in Maine, the defendant stated
that he had come up from New York City to sell the cocaine.234 The DEA
agent subsequently read the defendant the Mirandawarnings from a printed
card, after which the defendant accepted the agent's invitation to waive his
rights and give a statement. 235 In this case, two different official personnel
questioned the defendant before providing the Miranda warnings. There
was no temporal separation between the defendant's first statement to the
DEA agent and his warned confession. The case also refers to the second
confession as being "detailed," implying that it included information from
the unwarned statements plus additional information.2 36 As with the
previous two cases, there is no indication that the interrogator informed the
defendant that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him.
Using the Seibert factors, it appears that the defendant in Esquilin could
successfully argue that the warnings were not effective and his waiver was
invalid.
Finally, the Orso case offers the most difficult application of the
"totality of the confusion" test. In Orso, a woman suspected of robbing a
postal worker was transferred to the custody of two federal postal inspectors
after being arrested by local police on an unrelated charge.237 During the

228

United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 2000).

229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

id.
Id.
Id.
id.
id.
id.
Id.
id.
United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).
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drive to the inspectors' office, one of the inspectors spoke to the defendant
for twenty-five to thirty-five minutes about the robbery of the postal
worker. 238 The inspector admonished the defendant not to respond as he
described the evidence against her.239 While the inspector spoke, the
defendant made a number of incriminating statements that conceded her
involvement in the crime. 24 0 Ten minutes after arriving at the postal
inspectors' office, the inspectors read the defendant her Miranda rights
which she immediately waived. 241 The defendant subsequently confessed
to the robbery during an hour and a half interview with the postal
inspectors. 242 This case is distinct from the other lower court decisions for a
number of reasons. First, the initial interrogation did not consist of any
actual questions, just statements by the inspector.2 43 The defendant's
unsolicited responses to the inspector's statements, although incriminating,
were less than clear admissions of guilt. The two interrogations were
separated by approximately ten minutes but conducted in different
settings.244 As with all of the other cases, the suspect was not told that her
first statement could not be used against her. However, given the informal
nature of the first interrogation, the incomplete nature of her admissions,
and the change in venue, it is conceivable that a court could find that the
defendant would reasonably view the second interview as a separate event
from her discussion in the car.
c. The Seventh Circuit Takes Seibert for a Test Drive: UnitedStates v.
Stewart
In November of 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled on United States v. Stewart.245 Defendant Timothy
Stewart appealed his conviction for armed bank robbery in part on the
Id.
Id. The officer admitted to lying about much of the evidence to the defendant. Id.
240 Id. When informed of the potential sentence she could face, the defendant responded,
"Oh, I can do five years." Id. After being told the letter carrier who had been robbed had
identified the defendant, she said, "Well, if the letter carrier said it's me, then it must be me."
Id. And finally, when the inspector described the defendant's alleged accomplice, she
replied, "Oh, the gold-toothed boy." Id. This was the extent of Orso's pre-Miranda
statements to the police. Id.
238

239

241

Id. at 1033.

242

Id.

The Ninth Circuit noted that under Miranda "any words or actions on the part of the
police.., that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect" are considered an interrogation. Id. (quoting Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
243

244

Id.

245

388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2004).
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grounds that the admission of his confession violated Seibert.246 After
reviewing the facts surrounding the defendant's arrest and interrogation, the
court determined that the record was not complete enough to perform the
Seibert analysis and remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration.247
In October of 2001, a man wearing a mask and armed with a rifle
robbed a bank in Evansville, Indiana.24 8 The robber escaped in a white car
and was later seen running away from the direction of the bank and scaling
a wall. 249 Defendant Stewart was detained at a perimeter checkpoint
because he resembled the description of the suspect and because he
provided a questionable explanation for his whereabouts during the
robbery.25 ° When two Evansville police detectives arrived at the scene
twenty minutes later, Stewart voluntarily got into their car without any
prompting from the detectives.251 Stewart asked the detectives to drive him
downtown because he believed they intended
to arrest him, although he
25 2
denied any involvement in the robbery.
During the five minute drive from the perimeter checkpoint to the
police station, the detectives questioned the defendant about the robbery.253
The defendant once again denied involvement.25 4 Upon arriving at the
police station, the detectives took Stewart to an interrogation room and
again asked him if he was involved in the robbery. 255 The defendant
continued to deny participating in the robbery, but eventually admitted to
*providing another man, supposedly named Duel Felders, with the weapon
and the getaway car.256 After Stewart made this initial admission, two FBI
agents joined in the interrogation. 257
Stewart subsequently became
emotionally agitated and admitted to committing the robbery himself
without any accomplices. 258 Only at this point, fifty-five minutes after

248

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1081.

249

Id. The car was discovered in an alley adjacent to the bank, abandoned with the keys

246
247

in the ignition and a red dye stain, presumably from a dye pack, on the front seat of the car.
Id. at 1082.
250

Id.

251

Id.

252

Id.

253
254

Id.
id.

255

Id.

256
257

Id.
Id.

258

Id.
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being arrested, thirty-five minutes after being taken into custody by the
detectives, and twenty minutes after the station house interrogation began,
one of the detectives provided Stewart with the Miranda warnings.259
Stewart signed a waiver form and proceeded to answer questions for
another hour, after which he gave a tape-recorded statement. 260 At trial
Stewart's taped confession was
admitted into evidence and played for the
26 1

jury, which found him guilty.

Stewart challenged his conviction on the grounds that the confession
should have been suppressed because the interrogating officers used the
two-step interrogation technique dealt with in Seibert.262 The Seibert
decision was issued while Stewart's appeal was being briefed and the
Seventh Circuit attempted to apply the new precedent.263 However, the
court of appeals interpreted Seibert in a manner contrary to the expressed
positions of eight Supreme Court Justices. Judge Sykes of the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the only discernable principle to emerge from the
mix of opinions in Seibert was that the "totality of the confusion" factor test
should only be applied in cases where the failure to warn was intentional.264
She reasoned that Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion effectively limited
the reach of the plurality's holding to such intentional violations of
Miranda.265 According to Judge Sykes, if the confession was not elicited
through a deliberate attempt to avoid Miranda, the Elstad standard for
voluntariness should govern. 266 Precedent does give lower courts the
discretion, but not a mandate, to limit the scope of plurality opinions to the
holding of a concurring fifth vote.267 Judge Sykes took this course, despite

259 Id.

260 Id. at 1082-83. During the taped statements, the interrogating detective repeatedly
referred to prior questioning. Id. at 1083. The detective asked the defendant: "You have
admitted to committing that robbery, is that correct?" and later prompted the defendant by
stating: "You had told us that you had test drove that car." Id. However, the court noted that
it is unclear whether these references pertain to statements made before or after the Miranda
warnings were provided. Id.
261
262
263
264
265
266

267

id.
Id. at 1081.

Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1090.
id.
id.
"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result

enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in judgments on the narrowest grounds."' Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976)) (emphasis added).
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the fact that Justice Kennedy alone advocated an inquiry into an
interrogating officer's subjective motivations.268
After stating that the admission of a confession which violated the
Seibert factor test would be a clearly prejudicial error, Judge Sykes
concluded that she did not have enough information to determine whether
Stewart's confession was inadmissible under Seibert.269 Sykes indicated
that the known facts of the case pointed to a violation of Seibert, but felt
there were too many holes in the record to make such a ruling.27 ° Sykes
remanded the case to the district court to determine first if the interrogating
officers violated Miranda intentionally and only then to conduct the
"totality of the confusion" test with an expanded factual record.27 1
This decision awkwardly truncates the Court's ruling in Seibert. The
desire to avoid an inquiry into the subjective motivations of interrogating
officers was the single thread which unified the plurality and dissent in
Seibert. Judge Sykes's ruling disregarded the purpose of the Seibert
plurality's new test. Rather than determine if an interrogation was an
intentional violation of Miranda, the "totality of the confusion" test asks if
an interrogation so confused a suspect as to the nature of his rights that he
could not make an effective waiver. It is an objective examination of the
suspect's state of mind, not that of the interrogating officer. As noted by
Justice Souter, this was a deliberate decision: "[b]ecause the intent of the
officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here... the focus is on
facts apart from intent." 272 In dissent, Justice O'Connor endorsed excluding
the subjective intent of interrogating officers from consideration because it
could not impact a suspect's decision to confess. 273 An undeclared
intention on the part of an interrogating officer could not affect a suspect's
understanding of his rights or his decision to voluntarily waive them.274
Indeed, if the interrogating officers in Elstadhad harbored a secret intention
to confuse the suspect but conducted themselves in the same exact manner,
268All of the other Justices signed on to opinions rejecting such inquiries. See Missouri
v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 n.6 (2004); id.
at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
269 Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1091.
270

Id.

271 Id.at 1092. Sykes specifically noted that the content of the post-waming/pre-taped
confession was not included in the record. Id.at 1091. Without this information, Sykes
could not determine the extent to which the pre- and post-warning statements overlapped.

Id.
272 Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2613 n.6.
273 Id.at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 2617-18 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).

Only the

officer's outward conduct, which could be perceived by the suspect could impact the

suspect's decision.

SUPREME COURTREVIEW

[Vol. 95

Elstad's post-warning statement would still have been admissible under
Seibert.275 Conversely, if Officer Hanrahan had not intended to extract an
unwarned statement from Patrice Seibert but still referred back to her prewarning confession during the taped interrogation, Seibert would have
nevertheless been sufficiently confused about the nature of her rights to bar
admission of her second statement.2 76
Thus, Judge Sykes disregarded an essential component of the "totality
of the confusion" test. She instructed the trial court to determine on remand
whether the interrogating detectives' failure to warn was intentional, and
only if they do so find, to continue on to the "totality of the confusion"
test.2 77 If the trial court eventually finds that the failure to warn was
unintentional, the central command of Seibert will be unjustly ignored.
Yet, this case is a clear example of the type of behavior the Seibert plurality
aimed to deter. The arresting officer, the interrogating detectives, and the
FBI agents who joined in the interrogation all failed to provide Stewart with
his Miranda warnings until he had already been questioned for twenty
minutes and fully confessed to the robbery.278 The detectives who
questioned Stewart during the ride to the police station continued the
interrogation in the station house.2 79 There was no break between the
questioning in the detectives' car and the questioning in the station house. 8
There is a genuine question whether the interrogating detectives made
references to the pre-warning statement during the post-warning
interrogation, and there is no indication that the suspect was informed that
his first confession could not be used against him.28 ' Given these facts, it
appears that Stewart has a strong case that the admission of his confession
violated Seibert regardless of the subjective intent of his interrogators.
Only time will tell if the Seibert plurality's intentions will be carried out by
the lower court.

277

See Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REv. 248, 315 (2004).
Id.
United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1092 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 1082.

279

Id

280

Id.

281

Id at 1083. During the taped interrogation, a detective references prior statements by

275
276

the suspect, but the record is unclear as to whether these statements were made before or
after the Miranda warnings. Id. This is one of the issues the judge remanded to the lower
court for further determination. Id. at 1092.
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B. IMPLICATIONS
1. Questioning "Outside Miranda": A Case Study in Non-compliance
Despite the Seibert Court's decision not to base its ruling on the
intentional nature of Officer Hanrahan's failure to warn, no one doubts that
"two-step" interrogations are usually a deliberate attempt to avoid the
strictures of Miranda. There is no data available on how common "twostep" interrogations are in our nation's police departments.
As a
consequence, it is difficult to predict the impact that the Seibert holding will
have on law enforcement and suspects' rights in the future. However,
research has been done into the prevalence of questioning "outside
Miranda"and the police training methods which encourage this practice.282
The phrase questioning "outside Miranda" covers a number of different
practices, but usually refers to officers continuing an interrogation after283a
suspect has either invoked her right to remain silent or requested counsel.
The way that police departments have reacted to court decisions concerning
this practice provides a valuable window into how law enforcement may
react to the ruling in Seibert.
The practice of questioning "outside Miranda" emanated from what
commentators call the "new vision" of Miranda.2 84 This "new vision"
considers the traditional warnings mere prophylactic safeguards which are
not in themselves constitutionally required.2 85 The exceptions created by
the Tucker, Harris, and Quarles cases led police to believe that Miranda
did not bar them from questioning a suspect after she invokes her rights so
long as they did not seek to use the resulting confession or evidence in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.286 The Harrisexception did the most to further
this belief by allowing statements made after an invocation to be used for
impeachment purposes.2 87 As a result, many police departments determined

that once a suspect has invoked Miranda, they have "little to288lose and
perhaps something to gain" by continuing to question the suspect.
To further this goal, police departments began to adapt their
interrogation techniques to exploit the exceptions created by the Supreme
Court. Interrogators learned how to give the Mirandawarnings in a manner
282 See infra text accompanying footnotes

286-301; see also Leo & White, supra note

191, at 431-47, 460-63.
283 Weisselberg, supra note 107, at 1124.
284 Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 126.
285 Id.

286 See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
287 Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 126.
288 Id. at 127.
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that de-emphasizes their importance, reducing them to a simple bureaucratic
formality or treating their waiver as a fait accompli not requiring the
suspect's direct participation.289 If these techniques do not deter the suspect
from invoking her rights, then the interrogator will try to blunt the impact of
the invocation by asking the suspect to speak "off the record., 290 At this
point, the interrogator is aware that whatever information the suspect
volunteers cannot be used for the case-in-chief, but can be used for
impeachment purposes.2 91 It is highly unlikely that a criminal suspect
would be aware of this nuance.292 To capitalize on this loophole, police
training materials have promoted a number of techniques to induce a
suspect to continue talking after invoking her rights.293 By far the most
deceptive technique is to tell a suspect that since she has invoked her rights,
she can no longer incriminate herself.294 This induces suspects to
effectively abandon the protections they have just invoked because they are
unaware of the consequences of speaking further, thus mutating the
Miranda warnings from a procedural safeguard into a tool for extracting
impeachment material. 295 The undeniable goal of all these techniques is to
deceive suspects as to the significance of the warnings and the nature of
their rights. As one police instructor candidly admitted,296"[w]e are con
men.., and con men never tell the mark they've been had.
Charles Weisselberg, a University of California at Berkeley Clinical
Professor of Law, studied the impact a series of court cases dealing with
questioning "outside Miranda" had on the training procedures of California
police departments.2 97 He first examined People v. Peevy in which the
California Supreme Court upheld the Harris exception even in cases

289 Leo & White, supranote 191, at 433,437.
290Weisselberg, supranote 12, at 189.
291Id.at 126.
292 Id.at 161.

293These include asking the suspect if they can question her about issues unrelated to the
crime in question, asking if they can question the suspect in an informal "one-on-one" basis,
and asking if they could continue to discuss the matter without formally recording it. All of
these are techniques designed to elicit a voluntary response from the suspect which the
prosecution can later use to prove that the statement was not coerced and therefore available
for impeachment. Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Miranda Violations, Police Training
and Voluntariness: Recent Developments, at http://www.cacj.org/policystatements/
policystatement_12.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
294Weisselberg, supranote 12, at 160.
295 Id. at 161-62.
296 Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogationas a Confidence Game, 30
LAW & Soc'v REv. 259, 266 (1996).
297 Weisselberg, supranote 107, at 132-40.
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298
involving a deliberate violation of Miranda.
Although the court allowed
a statement elicited in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment
purposes, it clearly rejected the notion that the Miranda warnings were
optional.299 In fact, the Peevy court specifically referred to police having an
affirmative duty to cease questioning when a suspect invokes their right to
counsel and called a violation of this duty illegal. 30 0 However, this did not
prevent a division of the California Department of Justice from citing the
Peevy decision as endorsing the practice of questioning "outside
Miranda.30 ' This division, the California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training ("POST"), produced a training video endorsing
questioning "outside Miranda" which cited the decision's outcome and
disparaged the critical sections of the opinion as non-binding dicta
imposing no duty on California police.30 2 Similar sentiments were
expressed in training materials promulgated in the wake of Peevy by the
California Attorney General's Office, the Orange County District
Attorney's Office, and the Alameda County District Attorney's Office.303
Weisselberg noted that two cases turned the tide on questioning
"outside Miranda" in California, Dickerson and California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice v. Butts. 304 In many ways the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Butts anticipated the Dickerson ruling by declaring that although Miranda
"is a prophylactic rule, not a constitutional right," it "cannot be viewed
entirely apart from the constitutional rights it protects. 30 5 The Court spoke
strongly against intentional violations of Miranda and opened the door for
-the strongest sanction yet proposed for such a violation, the potential for
civil liability. 30 6 By declaring that "officers who intentionally violate the
rights protected by Miranda must expect to have to defend themselves in
civil actions,, 30 7 the Ninth Circuit cast the specter of § 1983 liability over
the Miranda debate.30 8
In response to Butts and Dickerson, law
enforcement organizations began to change their tune. The California

298 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998).
299 Id.at 1224.
300 Id.

301Weisselberg, supra note 107, at 1128, 1137.
302 Id.at 1137.
303 Id.at 1140, 1144-45, 1145.
'04 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999). For the sake of perspective, it should be noted that
Weisselberg was counsel for the named plaintiff in this case.
305 Id.at 1045.
306 Id.at 1050.
307 id.
308Itshould be noted that Weisselberg's study was published before the decision in

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). See infra text accompanying note 317.
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Attorney General's Office Sourcebook was amended to inform officers that
a "deliberate or intentional violation of Miranda is an extremely risky tactic
in California" which could easily lead to any resulting statements being
excluded for all purposes (including impeachment) and the officer being
sued by the defendant. 30 9 Other organizations, including the California
District Attorney's Association and numerous local police departments
subsequently issued warnings
against going "outside Miranda," citing the
310
threat of civil liability.
Weisselberg concluded his study with a recommendation that courts
should impose a strong exclusionary rule for statements gathered as a result
of a deliberate violation of Miranda and should extend § 1983 liability to
officers who question "outside Miranda.3 11 However, in the end, he
contends that the only way to completely eliminate questioning "outside
Miranda" is to rely on the leadership of police chiefs and sheriffs to
establish strong policies within departments forbidding the practice.3 12
When looked at in retrospect, it is evident that California's law
enforcement organizations considered questioning "outside Miranda" a
legitimate and useful tool even after the California Supreme Court deemed
it illegal. It took a statement from the United States Supreme Court as well
as the threat of civil liability before training procedures were revised to
demonstrate a new respect for Miranda'stenets.
2. Looking Forward:A CloudedHorizon
In light of Weisselberg's study, it is doubtful that Seibert will serve as
an effective deterrent for the "two-step" interrogation process. To effect a
true change in law enforcement procedures, the courts must establish clear
guidelines with real consequences. The Court in Seibert did neither. The
"totality of the confusion" test is a fuzzy analysis which has the potential
for vastly divergent outcomes. Furthermore, the meaningful consequences
which could deter violations have been done away with by recent Supreme
Court decisions.
One of the benefits of the Miranda warnings is that it gave police,
prosecutors, and judges a clear standard to evaluate the admissibility of

309

Weisselberg, supra note 107, at 1143.

310 Id.at 1142, 1149.
311

Id. at 1156-57. Weisselberg concedes that § 1983 liability would have a limited,

mainly symbolic impact. Noting the unsympathetic nature of the potential plaintiff and the
low possibility of significant financial damages, Weisselberg did not foresee many § 1983
suits actually being brought.
312 Id. at 1162.
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confessions.3 13 The alternative to Miranda, the default "totality of the
circumstances" test for voluntariness, has not been refined beyond the "soft
value laden standard" that has been used since the 1930s. 314 The Court's
decision in Seibert not only upholds the use of this imprecise standard in
cases of deliberate failures to warn but also complicates the analysis by
adding another factor test to the equation. The recent decision in United
States v. Stewart indicates that lower courts have received a muddled
message on how to apply this test and will proceed with undue caution in
In contrast, Professor Weisselberg's study
applying Seibert.31 5
demonstrates that law enforcement agencies do not respond with caution
when confronted with judicial uncertainty. 316 Without a clear edict from the
Supreme Court, police will err on the side of aggressive interrogation. This
is especially true if police know that their misconduct will not invite
negative consequences. In the past two terms, the Court has foreclosed the
use of the two "sticks" proven to be most effective in deterring Miranda
violations, civil liability under § 1983 and the exclusion of derivative
evidence. In Chavez v. Martinez, the Court ruled that a failure to provide
Miranda warnings before interrogating a suspect, regardless of whether it
was deliberate, cannot alone be grounds for a § 1983 civil suit if the
resulting statement is not used in the criminal defendant's trial.3 17 United
States v. Patane, decided on the same day as Seibert, ruled that physical
evidence obtained from a defendant's unwarned statement could be used in
the prosecution's case-in-chief. 318 The combined effect of these two
decisions is to reinforce the notion that police have little to lose and perhaps
something to gain by going forward with a "two-step" interrogation or other
techniques which violate the spirit of Mirandaand Dickerson.
When asked about the probable effect of the Seibert decision,
University of Michigan Law Professor Yale Kamisar predicted that the
plurality's weak standard would do little to change police procedure:
"[n]ow, the police trainers can just emphasize more refined ways to get
around Miranda,'3 19 and the Seibert test will be ripe for manipulation. Of
the factors the Court listed in its analysis, none are necessary but some
carry more weight than others. Whether the interrogating officer informs

Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 167.
Id.
315See supranotes 245-81 and accompanying text.
316 See Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 184.
317 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
318 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
319 Terry Carter, Miranda Still a Puzzle for High Court, 3 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 5 (July 2,
313

314

2004).
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the defendant that her previous statement could not be used against her for
any purpose appears to be a very persuasive factor. 320 But as noted above,
police interrogators have become very adept at de-emphasizing the
importance of clear and significant pieces of information, like the Miranda
warnings themselves.321 It is easy to imagine scenarios in which an officer
fully interrogates a suspect, provides the Miranda warnings, and then
explains: "OK, lets start from the very beginning. Everything you already
said, that was 'off record' and it won't be used in your trial. So if you want
to clarify anything, you know, make sure that you didn't skip anything or
lie to me about anything, this is your opportunity to set everything straight
for the record." Police departments could also make small but seemingly
meaningful changes to their interrogation procedures to manipulate the
"totality of the confusion" test. They could switch interview rooms, trade
out interviewers, and carefully plan the content of both interviews.
Interrogators could use the first unwamed interview to prime a suspect by
placing them at the crime scene, locating evidence, and identifying
accomplices. The second interview would then get to the heart of the
suspect's specific involvement. At this point, the police will have squeezed
everything they are allowed to out of the pre-warning statement and just
might get a full confession from the second.322
3. A ProposedAlternative to the Confusion
Whenever the Court approaches a challenge to police procedures, it
must balance the rights of criminal defendants with law enforcement's need
to effectively investigate crimes and interrogate suspects.3 23 However, the
Court's decision in Seibert does little to benefit criminal suspects, and much
to make the job of police, prosecutors, and especially judges more complex.
An imperfect, but more effective solution would be to abandon Seibert's
multi-factor test in favor of two clear directives:
1) Each suspect must be clearly informed, as part of her Miranda
warnings, that whatever statements she had made up to the point of warning
are inadmissible at trial.
2) Any reference to pre-warning statements made by the interrogator
in the course of a post-warning interrogation will be considered prima facie
320

Justice Souter noted that the absence of "a formal addendum warning that a previous

statement could not be used... is clearly a factor that blunts the efficacy of a the warnings
and points to a continuing, not a new, interrogation." United States v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct.
2601, 2613 n.7 (2004).
321See supratext accompanying notes 289-96.
322 Under Harris, Tucker, and Patane.
323 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-51 (1974).
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evidence that the suspect was misled as to the nature of her rights, thus
rendering any subsequent statements inadmissible.
Adopting the first directive was suggested and quickly rejected in
Elstad with the same backhanded tone used to dismiss Justice Brennan's
prescient dissent.32 4 And as noted above, such a mandate could still be
circumvented by skilled interrogators. But replacing a subjective factor test
with clear duties increases the likelihood that these commands will be
codified in departmental behavior and less subject to manipulation. If the
warning contained in the first directive were integrated into the Miranda
recitation, it would also be included in the forms police departments require
suspects to sign to prove that they were given and understood the warnings.
Suspects would receive information essential to a clear understanding of
their rights and police would have clear proof of this understanding to use
in court. The second directive, more than any other factor, bridges the gap
between an interrogator's actions and the suspect's perceptions without
delving into subjective intentions. When an interrogator refers back to a
suspect's pre-warning statements, he is clearly and objectively connecting
inadmissible evidence to potentially admissible evidence. This is a
verifiable act that could be easily established in court and directly
prohibited by police training. These two directives would not only strike a
better balance between suspects' rights and law enforcement's needs, but
also substantially reduce the use of the "two-step" interrogation technique.

V. CONCLUSION

The Seibert plurality undertook a difficult task. It sought to do away
with a distressing police practice without disturbing the precedents that
fostered the practice. Although the Court felt strongly that "two-step"
interrogations violated the spirit of Miranda, it was not willing to supplant
Elstad with a clear bright line rule. Instead it welded a new factor test onto
the rusty front of the "totality of the circumstances" machinery. The
likelihood of this decision having a positive impact on police procedures is
slim to none. As Justice Brennan noted in his Elstaddissent "[to] forbid the
direct use of methods ...but to put no curb on their full indirect use would
only invite the very methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and
destructive of personal liberty.' 3 25 With this ruling, the Court likely did

324

"Such a warning is neither practicable nor constitutionally necessary."

Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985); see supranotes 58-59 and accompanying text.
325 470 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 340 (1939)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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little to promote the rights of suspects and much to increase the "totality of
the confusion."
Stewart J. Weiss*

* I would like to thank Professors Ronald Allen and John Heinz for their insights
and
guidance. I also extend my sincerest thanks to my friends and family who have supported
me unflaggingly.

